Indiana Journal of Global Legal
Studies
Volume 4

Issue 2

Article 3

Spring 1997

The Role of the United Nations in Dealing with Global Problems
Jost Delbruck
Indiana University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ijgls
Part of the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Delbruck, Jost (1997) "The Role of the United Nations in Dealing with Global Problems," Indiana Journal of
Global Legal Studies: Vol. 4 : Iss. 2 , Article 3.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ijgls/vol4/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Journal
of Global Legal Studies by an authorized editor of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please
contact rvaughan@indiana.edu.

The Role of the United Nations in Dealing With
Global Problems
JOST DELBROCK"
In this article,ProfessorJost Delbruck maintainsthat the United Nations
(U.N) has evolved beyond its originalconception as merely an international
organizationdesigned to facilitate cooperation between its various Member
States. As evidence of this transformation,Delbruck offers examples of UN.
practice and its impact. In particular, UN. regulation concerning global
commons and human rights has encouraged globalization by confirming
limitations on States' rights and sovereignty. Further, the UN. practice of
involving non-governmentalorganizationshas helped to expand (orglobalize)
the recognizedsubjects of internationallaw.
According to Delbriuck, the UN. has become a global actor with a
meaningful role to play in the process of globalization. It should serve as a
forum for the determination of internationalpublic interest, promote the
participation of nonstate actors, and work to expand and reshape the
internationallegalframework. In this way, the UN. will live up to its new role
andprovidefor the emergence of a new global community.

* Professor of Law, Christian-Albrechts-Universitat, Kiel, Germany; Professor of Law, Indiana
University School of Law, Bloomington; Faculty Editor, INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES.
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INTRODUCTION

The title of this article appears trendy and is likely to satisfy the so-called
"realists" in that it seems to corroborate their perception of "non-realist"
international lawyers and political scientists as hopeless idealists and daydreamers. But even observers of the present-day international system with less
strong preconceptions might be puzzled by the topic I address in this article.
For, if one looks into the literature dealing with globalization and global
problems, the issues discussed are generally related to topics like the
globalization of markets, telecommunication, and global threats to the
environment, which, in turn, are primarily related to economic causes, e.g., the
unrestrained exploitation of natural resources and the pollution of the
atmosphere in order to maximize profits.' Much less is said about the
international and domestic legal implications of globalization,2 and even less
about the role and status of international organizations in the globalization
process, particularly the United Nations (U.N.).
The reason for this neglect of the U.N. and other international
organizations in the discussion regarding the implications of globalization may
be seen in the fact that the U.N. and State practice in general are still
preoccupied with coming to grips with the internationalization of politics or,
put differently, with constructively understanding the role of international
organizations in international relations. Furthermore, the recurrent failures of
the United Nations concerning the maintenance of international peace and
security have continuously clouded its reputation. Thus, there seems to be

1. For an instructive introduction to the ongoing "globalization" process within the international
(economic) system, see PETER DICKEN, GLOBAL SHIFT (1992).
2. Such legal implications can, for instance, be clearly seen in international law where the number
and kinds of subjects of international law are currently increased by nonstate actors such as
nongovernmental organizations and multinational corporations; a very visible impact of globalization on
domestic legal orders can be found in the area of domestic administrative law. See generally Alfred C.
Aman, Jr., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW INA GLOBAL ERA (1992); Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Law in a
GlobalEra: Progress,Deregulatory Change, and the Rise of the Administrative Presidency,73 CORNELL
L. REV. 1101 (1988).
3. "Internationalization" is to be distinguished from "globalization." While the former is a form of
institutionalized cooperation between States with the aim to complement their national efforts to promote
national power and welfare, "globalization" denotes a process of "denationalization" of the production or
provision of "public goods" (e.g., security and global climate protection), i.e., the fulfilment of public taskssometimes by a transfer of powers to supranational authorities-that by their very nature and dimension
transcend national capabilities. See Jost Delbrolck, Globalization of Law, Politics, and Markets-Implicationsfor Domestic Law: A European Perspective, 1 IND. J. OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 9, 10-11 (1993)
(defining "globalization").
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little promise in discussing the United Nations' role in the ongoing process of
globalization.
Only recently the global environmental challenges facing the international
community have caught the public eye by figuring prominently in U.N.sponsored fora, such as the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio." However, the progress
made by the Earth Summit is perceived as minimal because of strong national
interests hampering the adoption of more effective measures for the protection
of the global environment.' Thus, although globalization is a fact, it seems to
be a process largely separated from the ongoing political interactions within
and without international organizations, which are still widely dominated by
the self-centered, national interest-driven nation-states.
Looked upon from a distance, the present-day international system,
national policies, and the policies of international organizations appear to be
determined by factors deeply rooted in and informed by the historical and
cultural experiences and the political socialization of the nation-state era. This
era is distinguished by its fixation on sovereignty, national interest, and selfpreservation; and its focus on the "individual State" has been only marginally
mitigated by the less than a century old process of internationalization.
Nevertheless, political, economic, and social transactions are actually carried
out today on at least three levels that have evolved out of the international
system, in which the nation-state functioned as the exclusive international
actor:
1. the level of the nation-states established after 1648-the
year in which the concept of the sovereign nation-state was
6
legally recognized by the Westphalian Peace Treaty;

4. See generally United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio de Janeiro, June
3-14, 1992), 31 I.L.M. 814 (1992) (focusing on the environment and development). See also United
Nations: General Assembly Second Committee (Economic and Financial) Report Containing the
Recommended Resolutions in Follow-up to the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development, 32 I.L.M. 236, 254 (1993).
5. The core problems impeding effective progress in environmental protection, particularly the
protection of the ozone layer and the avoidance of harmful climate change, are paradigmatically analyzed
with regard to climate change by Christopher D. Stone, Beyond Rio: "Insuring"Against Global Warming,
86 AM. J. INT'L L. 445, 468-72 (1992). See also Von Friedemann Milller, InternationaleKonflike durch
Umweltgefiahrdung,48 EUROPA-ARCHIV 471 (1993).
6. The Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation accepted the territorial princes of
the Empire as representatives of sovereign territorial entities and, as such, parties to the Westphalian Peace
Treaties. It has to be added, though, that as members of the Holy Roman Empire, the territorial entities'
sovereignty was less complete than that of States in the nineteenth century. In other words, sovereignty as
a legal characteristic of States was the product of a continuous process that does not allow for sharp
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2. the level of international institutionalized and noninstitutionalized cooperation (internationalization) as a means
to make up for the increasing inability of nation-states to
pursue their national interest and welfare as independent, selfsustaining entities; and
3. the level of globalization processes characterized by an
7 or transnationalization of
increasing denationalization
economic, social, and ultimately political interactions and
transactions that, by their very nature, transcend the once
dominating paradigm of the international system, i.e., the
sovereign nation-state.
From a historical perspective, the United Nations would clearly have to be
seen as a central structure on the second level, the level of international
cooperation. In order to answer the question as to what role the U.N. could
play in dealing with global problems, it is therefore necessary to establish
whether and to what extent the United Nations, a creature of the era of
international institutionalized cooperation, is structurally capable of playing
a meaningful role on the third level within the process of globalization. For,
if the United Nations is structurally or inherently bound to the international
level (and thereby indirectly to the nation-state level), a negative answer to the
overall question implied by the title of this article would be a foregone
conclusion. If, however, the United Nations does have the potential to be a
constructive actor on the global level, then I may be able to sketch out, at least
tentatively, the U.N.'s future role in dealing with global problems; or to put it
in even more optimistic terms, the role it is already fulfilling.
I. THE UNITED NATIONS' POTENTIAL TO TRANSCEND ITS ROLE AS A
TRADITIONAL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

The examination of the U.N.'s potential to transcend its current role will
be developed in three steps. In the first section, I will look at the original

distinctions at any given point of time before and after the Westphalian Peace Treaty. Despite these
qualifications, this important treaty clearly marks the birth of the modem international system. See GEORG
DAHM ET AL., VOLKEiRECHT 4f (Walter de Gruyler ed., 2d ed. 1989).
7. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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concept of the U.N. in the historical context. Next, I will analyze U.N.
practice with regard to the national versus public interest debate, or, put
differently, the debate over the limits of State sovereignty. And, third, I will
examine the U.N.'s structural potential to transcend the traditional
international organization paradigm.
A. The OriginalConcept of the UN. as an InternationalOrganization
The full story of the development of international institutionalized
cooperation or of international organization cannot be told within the narrow
confines of this article.8 Suffice it to say, international organizations as a
structural element, and thereby as actors in the international system, came
about in the nineteenth century in an era marked by both the culmination and
the turning point of the concept of the independent, sovereign nation-state.'
Profound changes in economic and technological development caused States
to realize that they could no longer accomplish, on their own, the tasks of
providing for their nations' welfare and keeping their economies competitive
in universalizing markets. In other words, they came to realize their growing
interdependence. The technological revolution in communications (e.g.,
railway, telegraph) was a telling example of this new interdependence.10
Investing in these technologies only made sense within a framework of
international cooperation. For instance, it was necessary to develop common
technical standards and networking. In short, the nineteenth century saw the
beginning of the internationalizationof certain areas that until then were
considered inherently domestic or national responsibilities. International and

8. See DAHM ET AL., supranote 6, at 4. See also Jost Delbrflck, "Das VIkerrecht mufl auf einem
Bundfreier Staaten gegriindet sein "--Kant und die Entwickiung internationalerOrganisation ["The Law
of Nations Must Rest on a Federation of Free States "-Kant and the Development of International
Organization], in REPUBLIK
POLITISCHER ORDNUNG NACH

UND

WELTBORGERRECHT-KANTISCHE

DEM ENDE

DES OST-WEST-KONFLIKTS

ANREGUNGEN

ZUR

[THE REPUBLIC AND

THEORIE
WORLD

CIIZENSHIP] (Klaus Dicke & Klaus-Michael Kodalle eds., forthcoming 1997).
9. One could actually say that-in a dialectical process-the sovereign nation-state, which Georg
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel had just described as the reality of the moral idea and as reason as such, produced
economic and social conditions that required a reorganization of the forms of State interaction, which
undermined the very characteristics of the Hegelian State concept: sovereignty, independence, and selfsufficiency. See GEORG WILHELM FIEDRICH HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT §§ 257, 321-29 (T.M. Knox
trans., Oxford University Press 1967) (1821).
10. On these technological changes, see Jost Delbrilck, InternationalCommunications (Sea, Land and
Air Traffic, Telecommunications), in XV THESAURUS ACROASIUM OF THE INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THESSALONIKI 77, 84 (Dimitrios S.
Constantopoulos ed., 1987).
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institutionalized cooperation in other economic and related fields followed
suit."
The next decisive stage in the process of internationalization, as a means
to compensate for increasing deficits in the State's capacity to "go it alone,"
was taken when the European security system established by the Vienna
Congress, i.e., the Concert of Europe, collapsed around the end of the
nineteenth century.' The call for institutionalized cooperation of States for the
maintenance of peace and security became louder and was heard by the
international community after the disastrous destruction caused by World War
I. The League of Nations was the first, albeit unsuccessful, attempt at
internationalizing the responsibility of States for the maintenance of peace and
security." The failure of the League was due to political factors--most
prominently the lack of universality (e.g., absence of the United States and the
Soviet Union).'4 However, it also suffered from a major structural and highly
political defect: the League Covenant was strongly based on the respect for
the Member States' sovereignty, which, inter alia, incapacitated the
organization's decisionmaking ability. While conceptually committed to the
internationalization of the responsibility for international peace and security,
the League remained well within the perceptions and value sets of the
nineteenth century's international system.'5
The United Nations was founded on a different, yet still ambiguous design.
The U.N. Charter states that the organization shall be based on the sovereign
equality of its Member States' 6--a clear deferential reference to the traditional
supreme paradigm of State sovereignty.
But having experienced the
ineffectiveness and ultimate demise of the League, and shocked by the second

11. See JACOB TER MEULEN, I DER GEDANKE DER INTERNATIONALEN ORGANISATION IN SEINER
ENTWICKLUNG (1917). For a concise overview of the development of international organizations during
the second half of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, see Hans-Ulrich Scupin, History of
the Law of Nations 1815 to World War 1, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 767, 779
(Rudolf Bernhardt et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter EPIL]. See also Delbrilck, supra note 8.
12. See Stanley Hoffmann, InternationalSystems and InternationalLaw, in THE INTERNATIONAL
SYSTEM-THEORETICAL ESSAYS 205,217 (Klaus Knorr & Sidney Verba eds., 1961).
13. See DAHM ET AL., supra note 6, at 13.
14. See WINFRIED BAUMGART, VOM EUROPAISCHEN KONZERT ZUM VOLKERBUND [FROM THE
CONCERT OF EUROPE TO THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS] 142 (1974). For a somewhat skeptical commentary
about the thesis that it was the lack of universality that let the League falter, but which also emphasizes the
unfortunate effect of the United States' absence from the League, see Clive Parry, League of Nations, in 5
EPIL 192, 200 (Rudolf Bernhardt et al. eds., 1983).
15. See DAHM ET AL., supra note 6, at 13.
16. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(1) (stating "[tlhe Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign
equality of all its Members.").
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total World War, the founders also introduced provisions into the Charter that
heralded a new, progressive approach to internationalization. These four
fundamentally important principles are the follwing: (1) the prohibition of the
use or threat to use force; 7 (2) the power of the Security Council to issue
binding decisions and to see to their enforcement; 8 (3) the protection of human
rights as a cornerstone of peace;' 9 and (4) the exemption of all matters
determined by the Security Council to constitute at least a threat to
international peace under Chapter VII of the Charter from the non-intervention
principle (Art. 2(7)).2o On all counts, these principles and provisions created
a definitive inroad into the once sacred principle of sovereignty. Taking away
from States the essential signum of sovereignty-the right to go freely to war
(liberumjus ad bellum)-and subjecting the governments' treatment of their
citizens to the scrutiny of the members of the United Nations was truly
revolutionary. In addition, the philosophy underlying the U.N. Charter, at least
potentially, transcended that of traditional international organizations. It was
not only to serve as a complementary instrument to amend for deficits in the
State's capacity to deal with certain tasks hitherto considered its exclusive
responsibility. Rather, the philosophy of the U.N. Charter aimed at restricting
a State's sphere of exclusive competence in favor of international authority
moderated only by the veto power of the five permanent members of the
Security Council 2'-a privilege which in itself was a clear deviation from the
principle of the equality of States.'

17. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4) (stating "[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.").
18. U.N. CHARTER arts. 24,25, and chap. VII.
19. U.N. CHARTER arts. I, 55, and 56.
20. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(7). Article 2(7) provides that
[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the
present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement
measures under Chapter VII.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2(7) (emphasis added). This section has to be read in conjunction with art. 39 of the U.N.
Charter, which empowers the Security Council to determine that at least a "threat to the peace" exists, which
in turn means that the principle of non-intervention does not apply.
21. U.N. CHARTER art. 27(3) (providing that "[djecisions of the Security Council on all other matters
shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent
members .... (emphasis added).
22. For details, see DAHM ETAL., supra note 6, at 236, 238.
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The revolutionary meaning of the Charter was not fully understood at the
time because of the deteriorating political climate in the wake of the unfolding
Cold War. It is interesting to note, however, that some leaders of the medium
and small countries, like General Smuts of South Africa, did realize the
potential of the United Nations to exercise authority over the Member States,
particularly those not belonging to the "club of the great powers."' Their
concern, of course, was not to enhance this potential but rather to warn against
it. These leaders feared that if internationalization went too far, they would
lose their sovereignty.
From a doctrinal point of view, then, the United Nations and the other
organizations of the U.N. family represented a big step toward genuinely
internationalizing matters hitherto perceived as essentially belonging to the
realm of a State's domestic jurisdiction. Moreover, the United Nations Charter
particularly lent itself to further transcending the traditional confines of the
nation-state and the national interest-oriented international system. Of course,
this potential of transcending the traditional international system was neither
used by the U.N. during the first four decades, nor realized by the general
public, because of the ideologically motivated gridlock between the
superpowers. This gridlock was particularly visible in the veto-stricken
Security Council and in its declining role as the organ that, according to the
original concept, was vested with the primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security.' However, a closer look into
U.N. practice shows that over the years the organization succeeded in
unfolding not only the concept of genuine internationalization, but also in
opening up what today is conceived of as globalization, i.e., that certain
problems need to be solved because they are matters of an internationalpublic
or international community interest, rather than matters that should be
cooperatively addressed in support of national interests." This development

23. Attacks on the privileged status of the Great Powers (permanent seats on the Security Council,
veto power) were brought forward at the San Francisco Conference in 1945 under the leadership of
Australia. See 11 U.N. CONF. ON INT'L ORG. 492-94, 612-13, 650-51. For a summary of the debate, see
RuTH B. RUSSEL & JEANETTE E. MUTHER, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONs 713-49 (1958).
24. For a detailed account of the decline of the role of the Security Council in the 1950s and 1960s,
see JosT DELBROCK, DIE ENTWICKLUNG DES VERHALTNISSES VON SICHERHEITSRAT UND VOLLVERSAMLUNG
DER VEREINTEN NATIONEN (1964). The primary role of the Security Council is expressed in art. 24(1) of

the U.N. Charter which states, "[i]n order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its
Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace
and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on
their behalf." U.N. CHARTER art. 24(1) (emphasis added).
25. For this distinction between "internationalization" and "globalization" and the related distinction
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can be extrapolated from an analysis of what is here called the battle over
national interest versus international public interest in the main organs of the
United Nations, the Security Council and the General Assembly.
B. Nationalversus InternationalPublic Interest
Because of the precarious voting situation in the Security Council, the
General Assembly's practice is of primary interest in the present context. As
a comprehensive analysis of the rich practice of the General Assembly is not
possible within the framework of this article,26 two particularly interesting
areas of the General Assembly's activities will be taken up: the first relates to
the development of the concepts of the Common Heritage of Humankind27 and
the Global Commons;28 the second relates to the unfolding of the conceptual
framework and the substance of the international protection of human rights.
1. The Development of the Common Heritage of Humankind and
the Global Commons
In the course of the United Nations' efforts to promote worldwide
disarmament, the General Assembly, exercising its responsibility to contribute
to the progressive development of international law and to general and
complete disarmament, took up the problem of preventing the use, or rather
abuse, of areas outside national jurisdiction for military purposes. These areas,
which included outer space, the high seas, and the seabed, came to be known
as Global Commons; and the efforts of the General Assembly resulted in the
elaboration and finally the adoption of several important treaties enunciating
the principle of the Common Heritage of Humankind. In 1967, the Treaty on
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of

between national and international public interest, see Delbrilck, supra note 3, at 10-11.
26. Access to the General Assembly's practice under the U.N. Charter is facilitated by the periodically
updated U.N. SCOR, REPERTORY OF UNITED NATIONS PRACTICE (1955).

27. For a concise description and analysis of the concept of the Common Heritage of Humankind and
its origins, see Rildiger Wolfrum, Common Heritage of Mankind, in I EPIL 692, 692-94 (Rudolf Bernhardt
et al. eds., 1992), with further references. See also Ruidiger Wolfrum, The Principle of the Common
Heritage, in 43 ZErrSCHRIFTFOR AUSLANDISCHESOFFENTLICHESRFCHTUND VOLKERRECHT 312 (1983).
28. See generally ARVID PARDO, THE COMMON HERITAGE: SELECTED PAPERS ON OCEANS AND
WORLD ORDER 1967-1974 (1975); RODIGER WOLFRUM, DIE INTERNATIONALISIERUNG STAATSFREIER
RAuME [THE INTERNATIONAL1ZATION OF AREAS BEYOND STATE JURISDICTION] (1984); Arvid Pardo & Carl

Christol, The Common Interest: Tension BeAveen the Whole and the Parts, in THE STRUCTURE AND
PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 643 (R. St. J. MacDonald & Douglas M. Johnston eds., 1983).
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Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, was adopted and
opened for signature and ratification." This treaty was followed in 1971 by
the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and
Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and
in the Subsoil Thereof" The essence of these treaties was that the spaces
covered by them were declared the common heritage of humankind and
therefore were not subject to national appropriation. An earlier treaty must be
mentioned in this context as well, although not concluded under the auspices
of the United Nations: the Antarctic Treaty of 1959." This treaty is
particularly interesting since it established an international regime for
Antarctica and its protection (followed by a series of specific conventions
intended to protect the sensitive ecology of this unique geographical area). 2
In later years, the General Assembly endorsed the Antarctic Treaty's
underlying concept of serving the interests of the international community,33
although a number of States held claims to exercising national sovereignty
over large segments of the continent. 4 Clearly, what is at stake here is a
confrontation of national interests with an interest of the international
community at large. But also in the later conventions mentioned above, the
notion of a common interest to be protected over national interests is quite
apparent. Once on the agenda of the General Assembly, the concept of the

29. See generally Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Space Including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967,610 U.N.T.S. 206.
30. See generally Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other
Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean and in the Subsoil Thereof, Feb. 11, 1971, 955
U.N.T.S. 115.
31. The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 402 U.N.T.S. 72. For a summary recapitulation of the
emergence of the present status of Antarctica which, so far, has not been declared the "common heritage of
humankind," see Thomas Fitschen, Common Heritage of Mankind, in I UNITED NATIONS LAW: POLICIES
AND PRACTICE ch. 18 (Ruidiger Wolfrum ed., 1995) [hereinafter UNITED NATIONS LAW]. See generally Finn
Sollie, The Development of the Antarctic Treaty System--Trends and Issues, in ANTARcTc CHALLENGE 17
(Rildiger Wolfrum ed., 1984) [hereinafter ANTARCTIC CHALLENGE]; Rfidiger Wolfrum, Antarctica, in I
EPIL, supranote 27, at 173.
32. Out of the host of literature on the special ecological character of Antarctica, see Boleslaw A.
Boczek, Specially ProtectedAreas as an Instrument for the Conservation of the Antarctic Nature, in
ANTARCTIC CHALLENGE II at 65 (Rtidiger Wolfrum ed., 1986).
33. For instance, G.A. Res. 40/156 A-C, U.N. GAOR, Dec. 1985, refers to earlier resolutions adopted
in 1983 and 1984. Politicaland Security Questions, Antarctica, 1985 U.N.Y.B. 389, U.N. Doc. A/40/996.
For an instructive discussion of the controversial question of whether the United Nations should get involved
in the administration of a more internationalized Antarctic Regime, see Mohamed Haron, Antarctica and
the United Nations--The Next Step?, in ANTARCTIC CHALLENGE 11, supranote 32, at 321; Panel Discussion,
id at 333.
34. For details, see Wolfrum, supranote 31, at 173.
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Common Heritage of Humankind and that of the Global Commons was ever
more clearly emphasized in the work of the U.N. General Assembly and other
organizations such as the United Nations Economic, Social, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO).
In resolution 2749 (XXV) of 1970,3" initiated by Ambassador Pardo of
Malta, the General Assembly declared that "[t]he sea-bed and ocean floor, and
the subsoil thereof.., and the natural resources of the Seabed and the Subsoil
are the common heritage of mankind"-a notion that has been iterated over and
over again and was ultimately introduced into the Law of the Sea Convention
of 1982, entered into force in 1994.36 Although the underlying idea of these
nonbinding declarations and the ensuing treaties, now binding, did not meet
with great enthusiasm on the part of the industrialized nations technologically
capable of making use of these marine areas, these areas were now declared
the common heritage of humankind and closed to unilateral exploitation in the
national interest of individual States. But in the course of time and the force
of an increasingly interested world public opinion, consensus was reached on
the documents mentioned, clearly evidencing a commitment of States to what
may legitimately be called a public interest of the international community.
2. The Framework and Substance of the InternationalProtection of
Human Rights
The road to accepting the international protection of human rights, as a
matter of international public interest, was more prolonged and arduous.
Although the motivation of the original members of the United Nations and the
early accessors to the Charter for the idea of an international protection of
human rights was great in view of the outrageous atrocities committed by
fascist Germany and the sufferings of displaced persons and refugees after
World Wars I and II, the beginnings were modest, albeit not without appealing
pathos." The developmental stages of the codification of an impressive body
of universal human rights law can be summarized in a few sentences. In

35. G.A. Res. 2749, 1970 U.N.Y.B. at 78, 79.
36. See BUNDESGESETZBLATr [GERmAN FED. GAZETTE] Teil 2, Fundstellennachweis B, Dec. 1995,
at 546.
37. The most impressive document in this respect is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 10, 1948. Technically speaking, the Declaration is
simply a recommendation adopted by the U.N. General Assembly and as such it is without binding force.
See G.A. Res. 217/IlI, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 71.
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concretizing the rather vague human rights language of the Charter, the
General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on
December 10, 1948. A nonbinding, but solemn declaration, the Universal
Declaration, according to the prevailing view in international legal doctrine,
has become part of customary international law." After intense and bitter
debates over the meaning and scope of particular human rights and the
question as to whether economic, social, and cultural rights should be
included, the General Assembly adopted two human rights treaties: the U.N.
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights in 1966. Both of these treaties entered into force in 1976,
and have presently been ratified by 136 and 135 States respectively. 9 In the
same year, the General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, entered into force in 1969 and presently
ratified by 148 States.' Other important human rights instruments such as the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child followed in 1979 and 1989
respectively." Admittedly, the impressive but still incomplete enumeration of
important binding human rights instruments remains in rather sad contrast to
the present state of international human rights enforcement. However, the
most important developments relevant to the present context occurred in the
area of human rights enforcement.
First of all, from the very beginning of the General Assembly's work in the
field of human rights protection, the Assembly rejected the objections of
culpable States, which claimed that issues of human rights violations were
"domestic matters." The General Assembly's interpretation of Art. 2(7) of the
U.N. Charter-which prohibits the intervention of U.N. organs into matters
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of States--asserts that human rights,
having become part of binding international law, are no longer domestic
matters. Today, this interpretation has become accepted legal doctrine.42 State

38. See Karl Joseph Partsch, Human Rights in General, in I UNITED NATIONS LAW, supra note 31,
at ch. 60.
39. Status as of January 31, 1997. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the General Secretary
(visited Jan. 31, 1997) <http://www.un.org/DeptsTreatyt> [hereinafter MultilateralTreaties].
40. Id.
41. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of Dec. 19, 1979,
entered intoforce Sept. 3, 1981, with 155 States parties. MultilateralTreaties, supranote 39. Convention
on the Rights of the Child of Nov. 20, 1989, entered into force Sept. 2, 1990, with 189 States parties. Id
42. Felix Ermacora, Art. 2(7), in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS-A COMMENTARY, marg.
no. 19, 33 (Bruno Simma et al., eds., 1994) [hereinafter CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS].
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sovereignty is no longer accepted as the overriding international interest in the
protection of human rights. But with regard to the present context, i.e., the
globalization aspect of the U.N.'s role in human rights development, two other
aspects are of even greater interest than the clear inroads made into the
domestic realm of States. The General Assembly, in its quest to overcome the
apartheid regime in South Africa, adopted the Convention Against Apartheid
in 1973, 4' which declared apartheid not only to be illegal but also to constitute
a crime against humanity. The Convention obliges States which are parties to
the Convention to apply criminal sanctions against any person found guilty of
this crime, thus establishing for this crime universal jurisdiction, i.e., States
everywhere possess jurisdiction over any such crime irrespective of whether
they, or rather their citizens, are directly affected by such criminal acts.' This
contention is again a clear deviation from the traditional sovereignty-oriented
principle that only the injured State-through the injury inflicted upon one of
its nationals--could apply sanctions."5
Second, the most dramatic step was taken by the International Court of
Justice, the fifth of the main organs of the U.N. Building on the body of
human rights law initiated and developed by the U.N., the Court in the
Barcelona Traction Case' declared most fundamental rights, such as the
prohibition of racial discrimination and apartheid, to be rights erga omnes, i.e.,
to be enforceable by all States bound to observe these rights--irrespective of
whether they are directly affected by the violation. According to a wider and
more convincing reading of this decision of the Court, the erga omnes concept
even means that States not having participated in the creation of such rights

43. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid of Nov.
30, 1973, entered intoforce July 18, 1976. MultilateralTreaties, supra note 39.
44. G.A. Res. 3068/XXVIII, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., vol. 1,at 75 (1973).
45. An early forerunner of this approach is the crime of piracy, which since ancient times has been
subject to criminal sanctions based on the principle of universal jurisdiction. Today, art. 100 of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of Dec. 10, 1982, entered into force Nov. 16, 1994,
obliges States parties to "cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas
or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State"-a provision clearly based on the notion that any
State's apprehension of a pirate is legitimized by universal jurisdiction. For a concise summary of the
history of the crime of piracy and a critical appraisal of the "universal jurisdiction" approach, see Alfred P.
Rubin, Piracy, in 11 EPIL 259 (Rudolf Bernhardt et al. eds., 1989). Another forerunner of this approach
is the prosecution of the crime of genocide. See Genocide Convention of 1948, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S.
277.
46. Barcelona Traction (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4 (Feb. 5). According to a narrow reading of
the case, the erga omnes effect of the fundamental human rights norms cited by the Court only relates to the
enforcement of norms binding upon the States involved, not vis-i-vis third States; a wider reading is more
convincing. See infra note 47.
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under international law are bound by these most fundamental human rights.
Such understanding amounts to accepting a right of States to enforce these
fundamental human rights against States that did not consent to or take part in
the creation of the respective norms of international law."' As traditional
international law would not recognize any norm of international law as binding
on States not having consented to it (be it only by acquiescence), the wide erga
omnes concept can only be interpreted in the way that it is based on the
"international public interest" character of the fundamental human rights
norms.
Finally, the notion that it is the international public interest that forms the
basis of innovative human rights developments also holds true with regard to
the Security Council's practice in the field of human rights enforcement.48 In
a step-by-step approach, the Council interpreted the notion of a "threat to the
peace" in Art. 39 of the U.N. Charter to include grave human rights violations
with the consequence that the Council could apply sanctions against the culprit
State under Chapter VII of the Charter. 9 In the earlier decisions, starting with
resolution 688/1991,50 imposing sanctions on Iraq for oppressing the Kurd and
Shiite minorities, and on unraveling Yugoslavia, the Council qualified the
determination of grave human rights violations as a threat to international
peace by requiring that this violation be carried out by organized (military or
paramilitary) State forces and that it must have at least potential international
implications.5 But later on, in the cases of Somalia and Rwanda, the Council
let it suffice that international humanitarian disasters or genocidal activities
could be established. 2 Again, this shows that the Council became increasingly
involved in the internal matters of States because it sensed an international
public interest in stopping the massacres and other humanitarian disasters.

47. For a discussion of the different approaches to the notion and effect of erga omnes norms, see Jost
Delbrfick, The Impact of the Allocation of International Law Enforcement Authority on the International
Legal Order, in ALLOCATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 135, 14248, 163, 174-76, 186-88, 193-94 (Jost Delbriuck ed., 1994).
48. For a detailed, up-to-date analysis of the U.N. Security Council's activities in the field of human
rights enforcement, see HEIKE GADING, DER SCHUTZ GRUNDLEGENDER MENSCHENRECHTE DURCH
MILITARISCHE MAIBNAHMEN DES SICHERHEITSRATES-DAS ENDE STAASTLICHER SOUVERANITAT9? 126 (1996).

49. See generally Jost Delbruck, A Fresh Look at Humanitarian Intervention under the Authority of
the United Nations, 67 IND. L.J. 887 (1992) (discussing intervention for human rights violations under
Chapter VII of the Charter).
50. U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (1991).
51. GADING, supra note 48, at 9 1.
52. Id. at 116.
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C. Institutional and/or Structural Potential of the UN. to Transcend the
InternationalizationParadigm
The U.N. Charter, as the constitution of an international organization
founded on the equal sovereignty of its members, contains a rather
inconspicuous provision (Art. 71) that authorizes the Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC) to make available to itself the expertise of nongovernmental organizations. 3 This provision came to be very important in the
present context. Using this provision, ECOSOC set up an elaborate legal
framework by way of its organizational power to legislate its own rules of
procedure under which non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were invited
to, and were able to participate in, the work of ECOSOC's subsidiary organs
and that of the Council itself.' In order to make efficient use of the expertise
of a wide range of NGOs, on the one hand, and not to be overwhelmed by the
sheer numbers of NGOs" eager to have access to the Council, on the other
hand, they were categorized as A, B, and C or "Roster," now renamed
categories I, H, and "Roster"-according to certain criteria, such as size,
organizational maturity, and relevance of the NGOs' contribution to the work
of the Council and its subsidiary organs. The legal status of NGOs in
categories I to Roster varies in accordance with their meeting these criteria.
Category I NGOs have the right to participate in the sessions of Committees
and to present written and even oral statements, sometimes containing fullfledged draft resolutions or draft conventions. Category II NGOs have, in
substance, similar rights but to a more limited degree. The lowest status is
accorded to Roster NGOs 6 While the "rights" conferred on the NGOs do not
amount to guarantees under the primary rules of international law, it has
correctly been observed that conferring rights upon NGOs through the bylaws

53. U.N. CHARTER art. 71 (stating "The Economic and Social Council may make suitable
arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters
within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where
appropriate, with national organizations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations
concerned."). On the role of non-governmental organizations, see Stephan Hobe, Global Challenges to
Statehood-the Increasingly Important Role of Non-Governmental Organizations, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. (forthcoming Fall, 1997).
54. For an in-depth discussion of the practice of the ECOSOC and its subsidiary organs, see Prof. Dr.
Rainer Lagoni, Art. 71, in CHARTER OFTHE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 42, at 902.
55. The total number of NGOs between 1976 to 1991 rose from 688 to 928. As compared with 1949,
the number increased more than tenfold. See Klaus Hilfner, Non-Governmental Organizations,in 2 UNITED
NATIONS LAw ch. 98 (Rudiger Wolfrum ed., 1995).
56. See id at 929.
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of the ECOSOC makes the NGOs concerned secondary subjects of
international law or subjects of international law in a wider sense. 7
Furthermore, many other U.N. organs, including the General Assembly,
the Security Council, and the subsidiary organs created under treaty law drawn
up under the auspices of the U.N., allow NGO participation. Thus, NGOs may
have standing before human rights monitoring bodies.58 In addition, the main
political organs of the U.N. have also given international significance to other
nonstate entities by granting them observer status or the right to be heard ad
hoc like PLO leader Yasser Arafat in 1974 and the Jewish Agency in 1948.
Indeed, the observer status of the PLO became a permanent one in 1974."9
What this amounts to is nothing less than that these U.N. bodies have
greatly contributed to opening up the hitherto "closed shop" of subjects of
international law. In other words, they have transcended the confines of a
State-oriented international law and opened up to a globalizing trend, i.e.,
promoting the direct participation of nonstate entities in the international
(global) decisionmaking process. On the basis of these paradigmatic examples
of the potential of the U.N. to transcend the traditional sovereignty-oriented
international legal order, I now turn to sketching out the role that the United
Nations may have in dealing with global problems.
Iii. THE UNITED NATIONS AS A GLOBAL ACTOR
As has become clear from the foregoing analysis, globalization has much
to do with transcending the paradigm of the sovereign nation-state as the
dominant actor in international relations. Likewise, global problems are those
that by their very nature transcend the capacity of the nation-state to deal with
them effectively as an independent entity. For instance, global threats to the
environment; massive, persistent gross violation of human rights; and the
protection and use of natural resources in the global commons are problems

57. This view was taken by Hermann Mosler as early as 1962. See Herman Mosler, die Erweiterung
des Kreises der V6kerrechtssubjekle [The Increasement of the Number of Subjects of InternationalLaw],
22 ZEITsCHRiFr FOR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 1(1962).

58. See, for instance, art. 34 of Protocol No. I I to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, restructuring the contrb1 machinery established thereby of May 11, 1994,
openedfor signature May 11, 1994 (providing for complaints to be addressed to the Court of Human Rights
by non-governmental organizations). For text, see 33 I.L.M. 960, 962 (1994).
59. On the foregoing, see Sabine von Schorlemer, LiberationMovements, in 2 UNITED NATIONs LAW,
supra note 55, at ch. 89. See also G.A. Res. 3237/=OUX, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Agenda Item 108, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/3237(XXIX).
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that are far beyond the capabilities of even the strongest nation-states. What
role may the U.N. play in dealing with such global challenges? Roughly
speaking, one may distinguish three areas where the U.N. may have a
constructive role to play.
A. The UN.as a Forumfor the Determinationof the Public Interest of the
GlobalizingInternationalCommunity
As pointed out above, the main U.N. organs have directly contributed to
promoting what has been referred to here as the international "public interest"-a notion that is, on the one hand, well-known in domestic public law,' but,
on the other hand, quite new on the international level and admittedly a
somewhat hazy concept. It has experienced many attempts at general or
abstract definition and has consistently withstood such attempts." Therefore,
a considerable number of constitutional lawyers and political theorists have
rejected the concept. However, State practice, particularly in democratic, ruleof-law political systems, shows that the notion of the "public interest" has
played an important role and still does. Mainly, the legislatures and the courts
have articulated the meaning of the notion of "public interest" not in abstracto,
but in a concrete sociopolitical setting. It has proved to be an almost
indispensable criterion in balancing individual rights versus other law-based
values held in a given society.6"
The U.N. organs have increasingly taken the same approach. Balancing the
right of States to be free from external intervention and the need to protect
individual human rights, the General Assembly and the Security Council have
in concreto taken decisions that give priority to the latter principle--and more
often than not-out of a commonly felt concern, not because of some traditional
national interest. These decisions have been taken after due public (and

60. Synonyms are the "general" or "public welfare," the "bonum commune" or "salus publica."
These notions have already been introduced into public law by social philosophy and political theory
centuries ago. See Christoph Link, Gemeinwohl, in I EVANGELISCHES STAATSLEXIKON co. 1062 (Roman
Herzog et al. eds., 2d ed. 1987).
61. Id (emphasizing the difficulty in defining "public interest").
62. An example in constitutional law is the application of a balancing test in cases involving the
constitutionality of government regulation of free speech. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 580 (1988). A similar approach is taken by the German Constitutional Court,
although with a stronger emphasis on the "public interest." See KONRAD HESSE, GRUNDZOGE DES
VERFASSUNGSRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND (10 ed. 1977). On limitations on freedom of

at § 12(ee)-(ff).
speech, see id.
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sometimes not so public) debates of the issues involved leading to the
determination of what "the common concern," i.e., the "public interest,"
required to be done.63
The upshot is the "international public interest"-though a potentially
elusive concept in abstracto--canbecome a meaningful criterion in concreto
upon which action can be taken. International fora, like the U.N. General
Assembly and other U.N.-sponsored organizations, have a role in hammering
out the concrete meaning of an international public interest in particular
situations. With this background, these fora, particularly the U.N. General
Assembly, which represents the vast majority of the States, can serve as the
platform where international discourse can take place in determining what is
"the international public interest" in matters like "global environmental
protection" and "human rights protection." Success, of course, depends on the
development of an international political culture, especially on the part of the
media and specific interest groups. These groups must educate people that the
process of determining the international public interest is not a matter to be
produced as flowers in a "hot house" or that can be "pressure cooked." The
international discourse must be given time and should not be preemptively
devalued as "just talk" before it has had a chance to become meaningful.
B. The UN 's Role in Promoting Participation of Nonstate Actors in
InternationalLawmaking, Dispute Resolution, and Forming a Network of
Global Governance
Just as the U.N.'s role in determining the public interest of the globalizing
community has a strong procedural dimension, so does the U.N.'s role in
promoting the participation of nonstate actors. The global nature of the
problems and challenges facing the international community requires the
development of a regulatory regime beyond the nation-state. This regime
should interconnect States, international organizations, and other nonstate
actors in a network of global governance. The main feature of this new format
of regulatory authority is that it still relies--to a certain degree--on the States,
but also increasingly on other actors who have de facto played an important

63. While it was argued, at the time, that the action taken by the U.N. Security Council against Iraq
was predominantly-if not exclusively-out of material interests in the oil of the region ("blood for oil," as
the slogan went), such insinuation is clearly out of place in the cases of Security Council interventions in
former Yugoslavia, Somalia, or Rwanda. On these cases, see generally GADING, supra note 48.
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role in the international system but who are now coming to the fore as legal
entities. Also, it must be added that the States, as players in the supraterritorial
governance, are not the same as they used to be in the pre-global era. The role
of the State has been and is being transformed by the process of
globalization."
The example set by the United Nations in recognizing NGOs as valuable
partners in the international decisionmaking and lawmaking process can serve
as a model for what the U.N. can do in the future in furthering the role of
nonstate actors, particularly strengthening their participatory rights with a view
to enhancing the legitimacy of the envisaged global regulatory regime. But
there is not only a need for widening the scope of nonstate actors' participation
in global governance. There is also a need to develop a global legal
framework in order to curb the power and influence of such global actors as
multinational corporations (MNCs) and powerful interest groups like
Greenpeace. The U.N.-initiated code of conduct for MNCs65 is an early
example for what is advocated here as the U.N.'s legislative role in dealing
with a certain global problem.
C. The Role of the UN. in Promoting the Progressive Development of
Interactions in the Field of Global Concerns: Promotingthe Understanding
ofPublic Interest Norms as Erga Omnes and/or Jus Cogens Norms
The U.N. General Assembly has the mandate and the competence to
promote the progressive development of international law. It is evident from
the foregoing that tradition-based international law is not adequate for dealing
with global problems. Starting from its hitherto narrowly defined notion of
international legal personality-reserved predominantly for the sovereign
nation-state with a gradual opening for State-based international organizations
and a marginal opening for individuals--to the still overwhelmingly held
notion that international law is binding because of the consent of States,
international law more or less is conceptually still on the first and second
levels, i.e., the nation-state and traditional international organization levels.'
Building on the groundwork laid by the U.N. in perceiving at least the most

64. On this also, see Hobe, supranote 53.
in 2 UNITED NATIONS LAw,
65. For details, see Dietmar W. Bachmann, TransnationalCorporations,
supranote 55, at ch. 129.
66. See supra p. 280, with particular reference to items 2 and 3.
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fundamental human rights to be binding upon and/or enforceable by all States,
their role could be to further the understanding of the international legal order
as one that is binding as a matter of necessity, not because of an individual
State's consent.6' If humankind is to survive, the global challenges such as
effective global environmental protection, prevention of gross violations of
human rights, and the many other important issues (e.g., worldwide migration,
desertification, starvation) must be addressed. The ability of individual States,
particularly the larger ones, to choose freely to opt out of a global governance
for survival, cannot be viewed as compatible with the notion of a legal order.
Given the record of the U.N. General Assembly in promoting the notion of
international public interest as a legitimizing factor in the pursuance of vital
interests of the international community, it could also play an important role
in reconsidering and reshaping the very basis of the international legal order
itself and making it fit to be the normative framework, not only of a system of
self-interested States, but of that of an emerging global society.6
CONCLUSION

Many critics may accuse my proposal for a network of global governance
as being too idealistic. But looking at the facts of ongoing globalization
without prejudice, namely at the political starting points for a role that the U.N.
can play in dealing with global problems, the foregoing is not without basis in
the real world. Has there not been much complaint about the lack of not only
a political, but also a normative, vision for the future? It is suggested that
there is one, if we look closely and without negative preconceptions.

67. For a detailed discussion of the problem of where the binding force of international law can be
derived, see DAHM ET AL., supra note 6, at 41. For an illuminating and cutting critique of the present state
of international law and its binding force, see Philip Allott, The InternationalCourt of Justice and the Voice
of Justice, in FIFTY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 17. (Vaughan Lowe & Malgosia
Fitzmaurice eds., 1996).
68. Similar to the notion of a global public interest oriented law envisioned here, Philip Allcott
discusses the need for developing a "true" international law that is the "voice of justice" for the human race.
Allott, supra note 67, at 39.

